Tensions are growing between Turkiye-Pakistan and Israel-Cyprus-Greece.

Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean can no longer be taken for granted as a result of three recent developments:

1) thegrowing Turkish-Israeli rivalryin post-Assad Syria;

2) Israels reported plans to establish arapid response forcewith Cyprus and Greece;

and 3) Turkish ally Pakistansnew military tieswith Eastern Libyas General Khalifa Haftar.

The aforesaid are unfolding amidst Israels plans for anunderwater EastMed gas pipelineto Greece andTurkiyes maritime claimsthat cut right across its route.

The reported rapid response force could accordingly be assembled to defend the EastMed if construction on it were to begin while Pakistan might establish a military presence in Eastern Libya under the cover of training Haftars forces for complementing Turkiyes in Western Libya so as to help Ankara counter this. Unaware observers should review this articlehereto learn more about the rapprochement between Turkiye and Haftar, previously enemies, which advances the formers abovementioned maritime claims.

The Turkish-Pakistani Tandem (TPT) might not directly clash with Israel over the EastMed, at least not at first, since its much more likely that Turkiye would initially pressure it in Syria while Pakistan stirs trouble on its behalf at sea (perhaps with drones) through its potential military presence in Eastern Libya. The purpose would be to keep tensions manageable and plausibly deniable. That would be difficult to do if they targeted NATO member Greece, however, which could backfire by rallying the bloc around it.

For that reason, TPT would probably employ low-level and plausibly deniable hybrid provocations against Israel in the first stage, though Israel would be expected to call them out on this if it happens. Its not possible to accurately forecast what might follow but its sufficient to predict that Israel likely wouldnt back down since itrarely does so under military pressure. A conventional escalation might therefore be in the cards and that could in turn set the entire region aflame if it spirals out of control.

Turkiyes interest in involving Pakistan in this dispute wouldnt just be to diffuse responsibility for any escalation over its maritime claims but to have the support of the only Muslim nuclear power in order to deter Israel from responding in a way that risks a war between them. For its part, Pakistan would probably be happy to saber-rattle against Israel since this would play well domestically, but it understandably wouldnt want Israel to force its hand into fighting a conventional war or backing down.

Any serious escalation between TPT and Israel would assuredly lead to an American diplomatic intervention given that all three are its close partners. Which side the US would support, however, remains unclear. While Israel is one of its most special partners, the EastMed pipeline could challenge the USnewfound energy hegemonyover the EU, so the argument can be made that it might prefer to impose a compromise whereby Israel supplies Turkiye with gas just like itspoised to supply Egypt.

If Syria joins the Abraham Accords, then a pipeline could be built across its territory from Israel to Turkiye, while Lebanon could be involved as well if it too signs onto the accords. Even without that happening, an underwater pipeline could connect Israels offshore gas fields with Turkiye, which would strengthen their complex interdependence for reducing the risk of conflict. That would be the best-case scenario from the US perspective for resolving Turkish-Israeli tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Andrew Korybko